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Why Canadian Indian Law is Important to Alaskans: Why Indian Law in Alaska is 
Important to Canada 
Federal policy governing indigenous peoples in Canada has been marked by 
repeated glances south and west (at Alaska) as it has been formed through 
parliamentary edict, case law and Constitutional entrenchment. Although rooted in 
a common Crown policy, the discrete history of Canadian policy has diverged from 
American practice even as the country's historical and its political development have 
diverged. Unlike United States policy, the underpinnings of Canadian Indian law as 
it related to aboriginal title land rights and the limits and potential of tribal 
sovereignty are only now coming into focus. This belated articulation of Indian 
rights parallels similar developments in Alaska where land rights and tribal rights 
are only now being defined. 
In both Alaska and Canada, hunting and fishing rights and tribal governance 
are political and legal matters whose impact on resource development and control by 
provinces and states make neat application of older Indian law concepts less 
predictable. Cases in either place offer guidance to federal courts in either country 
within a modern debate over public land rights. The author suggests that attorneys 
in each place monitor case law and legislation only now emerging. 
For indigenous peoples of Alaska and Canada, more than similar physical 
environments predispose them to study the ever changing legal environment in their 
respective countries. Each group struggles within the context of a modern federal 
system to seek explicit governmental validation of group rights long considered to be 
at the heart of their ways of life. 
Each seeks firm commitments from its national government that its traditional 
uses of land will continue into the future and that the group will have a meaningful 
role in management of the land and resources and of its own af airs. For each group 
the legal basis for negotiation is only now becoming clear. For each group 
fundamental questions of ownership and governmental authority over traditional 
lands have been left long unresolved. This is in sharp contrast to Indians in the rest 
of the United States where both statute and court decisions have long ago formed a 
frame of reference which set the potential as well as the outer limits to land and 
governmental control by tribes. 
Historically, Alaska Indians, Eskimo and Aleut peoples and Canadian Indian, 
Inuit, and Metis appear to have been left behind when their situations are compared 
with the legal results of Indian policy in the southern continental United States (or 
the "lower 48"). That policy which flowed from the early Crown colonial policy 
developed for North America to secure land and trade monopolies and to remove 
original occupants from new frontiers when their land became more important than 
their roles as traders. That Indian policy carried forward in the United States as an 
attribute of federal policy an ultimate Constitutionally-grounded national monopoly 
over Native lands and Native communities. Rooted in early decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court, Congress was said to have plenary authority over 
extinguishment of aboriginal rights to use and occupancy of land. As an attribute of 
that same process, a process that masked a continuing struggle over resources, 
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chiefly public land and water, between national and territorial or state authorities, 
American Indian groups were deemed to a have continuing dependent sovereignty 
over their people, subject to a process of removal and reallocation of that authority to 
the federal and state governments by the Congress (Wilkinson, 1982). 
The impetus oflndian policy in the u lower 48" was initially an ef ort to control 
pressures along the national frontier. Indians were protected until they could be 
assimilated into the national citizenry. Placed on lands reserved for them, lands 
which replaced vast areas used for hunting and gathering activities held under 
aboriginal title, they were clustered into reservationu home lands. " While judicial lip 
service and relative legislative indif erence allowed tribal governments to use their 
residual sovereignty, what was actually implemented was a loosely camouflaged 
American version of British colonial policy. Overtly, this policy stressed in its every 
permutation a formula of u doing right" for indigenous peoples. In fact, Indians were 
used as pawns to hold vast federal acreages of  the private market and out of 
territorial and state hands. This use oflndians to hold in place federal land acreage, 
a policy that preceded development of a strong national parks policy, was joined with 
a federal effort to limit introduction of a state legal presence on these same lands by 
supporting tribal sovereignty. Periodic breakup of the tribal land mass, the 19th 
century allotment period being the best example, or reassertion of federal authority 
as tribal authority under the guise of the Indian Reorganization Act (United States 
Congress, 1934), with repurchase under the same act of some lands lost during the 
allotment period, are best understood as ebbs and flows in the continuing struggle 
between states and the national government over public lands. The legal status of 
Indians and their residual tribal sovereignty are then a matter of rather secondary 
interest and ef ect to these powerful players but an ever important tool in the 
struggle. 
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The obligation of some government to provide for indigenous peoples, when 
stripped of their own economic sustenance and transformed into welfare societies, 
was often a strong motivator for state governments to defer to federal-tribal 
arrangements. So were generous private leasing programs of tribal lands. When 
Congress, during the termination era, of ered the option to many states to take up 
criminal and civil law jurisdiction without reduction of the tribal land base, many 
states determined that the net outflow of tax revenues did not warrant the 
assumption of legal jurisdiction.I These same states may well have had second 
thoughts about the trade-of  implicit in delivery of state services when they were 
barred from taxation of natural resources found on Indian lands in the 1960s. 
American Indian law advocates had by the late 1960s staked out and confirmed 
Congressional preemptive authority and tribal authority to tax and regulate tribal 
land in that new policy era of "self-determination without termination." 
In recent years Indians have been able to reach beyond reservation boundaries 
and reassert treaty rights to fish, water and even ownership of land traded away 
without federal approval. However, the legal advantages secured by "lower 48" 
Indians, their secure trust territory granted through treaties after extinguishment of 
their aboriginal title, territory with clearly demarcated geographic jurisdiction for 
invigorated (and funded) tribal governments, may have also set in place permanent 
constraints on the tribes' abilities to define social change on their own terms. 
Alaska Natives and Canadian Aboriginal people entered the late twentieth 
century with much less legal groundwork established through case law or through 
legislation. 
Alaska Natives had signed no treaties. Although they laid claim to virtually 
the entirety of Alaska through use and occupancy-subsistence activities which they 
vigorously pursued from traditional village staging areas, the Congress had not 
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taken upon itself to settle their land rights. In the treaty of purchase from Russia and 
in successive Organic Acts which created a civil governmental structure in the 
federal territory, the issue of confirmed Native land rights was held in abeyance 
(Case, 1984). In Canada the treaty process moved across the continent and replaced 
Native title with reserves.2 It remained unclear whether aboriginal title existed 
among indigenous groups in the Western provinces until the 197 0s. The territories 
remained much as Alaska. Furthermore, in Canada, even where aboriginal title was 
said to exist, it was viewed as something less than a legal right, characterized as a 
personal and usufructuary interest. Once this Indian interest was removed, Crown 
land would become provincial land in its entirety and not federally owned and 
governed land as in the United States. 
In the matter of land rights, Indian policy, whether legal or political, provided 
few clues for Northern peoples of Canada or for Native Alaskans as to the level of 
control they would enjoy over the lands they used for survival and participation in 
the cash economy. In neither place did frontier pressures or prospects for statehood or 
provincial status create a determined early legal or political need by the national 
government to either protect Native land rights, by defining them or use Native land 
rights and governmental authority as a stalking horse in a state-federal battle for 
control. Belatedly, Canadian Eskimos were said to be legally "Indians. " Belatedly, 
they were confirmed as capable of holding land by aboriginal title. 
In Alaska, while aboriginal title settlements were politically delayed, some 
aboriginal rights were lost in court. In Tee-Hit-Ton (1955) the Supreme Court 
determined that those rights lost were not property rights of legal significance, 
subject to compensation under the Fifth Amendment but special claims snatched 
away "as every schoolboy knows" by conquering whites. Some areas within the vast 
Alaska domain were demarcated for Alaska Native use as special purpose reserves by 
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the Executive Branch, but only one classic congressionally-mandated Indian 
reservation was established by Congress, this for a group of Canadian Indians who 
were participants in a religious experiment. 
The concept of inherent tribal sovereignty, employed by Justice Marshall in the 
earliest days of the United States as a weapon to avoid state legal assimilation of 
Indian communities and their lands, did not evolve from Indian-Canadian relations 
in Canada even when they were marked by treaty relations. Neither was the concept 
of federal trust responsibility a product of Canadian Indian policy, in the sense that 
aggrieved tribes could sue for violations of parliamentary policy when wrongly 
implemented, until trust responsibility was fleshed out by the the supreme court in 
this decade.3 Only in the 1980s did an abuse oflndian property rights by the federal 
bureaucracy provide a glimmering of the historical American Indian law remedy 
against legislative commitments made but left unimplemented. 
In Alaska as in Canada, inherent tribal sovereignty was made evident in tribal 
activity but remained unconfirmed by the courts as a secured tribal right and basis 
for negotiation. One can argue that the practice of legally recognizing tribal 
sovereignty had less utility for federal policymakers in Canada or in Alaska than 
elsewhere in North America. The Canadians employed Indian Act band governments 
as instruments of tutelage and as substitutes for traditional tribal government. The 
federal government in Alaska deployed teacher-missionaries to guide Native villages 
into Western civilization, employing village councils as neotribal governments. 
Neither national government was as concerned with using the concept of tribal 
sovereignty to create a barrier between Indian Country controlled by the federal 
government and tribe and settlers who would establish a state. In the Canadian 
North, other practices impacted tribal governments rooted in groups who lived off the 
land.  Resettlement programs of  the  1950s reorganize d Native  
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communities to befit service requirements, especially education of the young. In both 
places it would appear that heavy-handed colonial policies assumed that traditional 
tribal authority was buried under developed plans for municipal style Native 
government equipped with minimal, delegated authority (Conn, 1985). Studies in 
Alaska demonstrate that traditional government simply assumed whatever shape 
was externally required and continued as an active force. This little concerned 
federal or even state administrators, however, because de facto use of tribal 
sovereignty challenged no other sovereign for governance of lands and resources. 
States and Provinces 
The developed tensions between states and Indian tribes so often viewed as the 
primary reason for ultimate federal initiatives in "lower 48" Indian af airs was not so 
evident in Alaska or in Canada although the reasons were different in each place. As 
a l egal matter, the American doctrine that suggested state law of general application 
applied to Indian country only when expressly allowed by the Congress was turned on 
its head in Canada. Provincial law applied to Indians, even Indians on band reserves, 
unless a federal conflict arose or the law singled out Indians or Indian property. 
Alaska remained a federal territory until 1959. Before 1959 Congress had 
determined that state law would replace federal law as the single official expression 
of criminal law in Indian Country. What villagers chose to do among themselves 
governmentally was accepted by both territorial and state field representatives as a de facto matter and even encouraged, but never validated (See Conn and Hippler, 
197 5). 
In short, the the legal situation of indigenous peoples in Alaska and Canada 
presented a bemusing picture for Indian law practitioners if schooled in the root 
American Marshellian notions that Indian law meant aboriginal title transformed 
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into land held in federal trust, peopled by persons with acknowledged (though 
limited) sovereignty and subject to (or protected by) a judicially enforceable federal 
trust relationship. 
Little of this legal foundation material had been laid in Canada or in Alaska by 
the late twentieth century. In the main, land rights remained to be settled. Federal 
obligations (as opposed to federal charity) were unclear and tribal sovereignty 
uncertain and unacknowledged. At risk in both places were aboriginal ways of life 
guided by trapping and subsistence cultures that, more than an economic force, were 
for many Native communities the closest thing to a continuing community self­
defini tion. 
If the early 1980s are employed as a moment in time to stop the action and view 
significant events on the Alaskan and Canadian sides of the border, what parallels 
and shared concerns emerge? 
Inuit Alaskans had responded to threats to bowhead whaling by linking their 
cause with Inuit in other circumpolar countries. Under the visionary leadership of 
Eben Hopson, they had created the Inuit Circumpolar Conference to view globally a 
range of shared political and social issues. Other Alaska Native leaders and many 
villagers had been lulled into one of two distinctly parochial assumptions about their 
present and futures as indigenous peoples. 
One side viewed Alaska as unique among American Indian legal cultures. The 
"Alaska is different" syndrome had as its cornerstone the landmark Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act (or ANCSA) of 197 1. Spurred by a desire to construct the 
TransAlaska Pipeline over land to which Natives made aboriginal claims and by 
Alaska' s desire to select from federal lands the state's share, oil companies and the 
state made common cause with Natives to secure a Congressional settlement of 
unrecognized claims. Congress extinguished all contested Native claims and, as an 
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ultimate irony, expressly extinguished aboriginal hunting and fishing rights that 
formed the basis of those claims. The dif erence between this settlement and 
historical treaty settlements is profound. Tribes were not party to the settlement. 
Natives then living were enrolled and made shareholders in village and regional 
corporations which received 44 million acres of land along with a cash settlement 
from the federal government and the state's oil wealth. A new village institution, a 
for-profit corporation established under state law, arose to receive surface estates 
surrounding the villages. The village core went to state chartered municipalities 
with individual homesites to current residents, Native and non-Native alike. 
Federal trust protections did not follow the land with this settlement. The conveyed 
land was immediately treated as a corporate asset. The stock was made subject to 
alienation in twenty years. Subsistence protection was left for later resolution by the 
Congress. 
This profound experiment in self-determination set Alaska Natives apart from 
all other Indians in the United States. However, the Congress had used its Indian 
law authority to pass the act. 
In the decades following the implementation of AN CSA, Congress has amended 
it many times. These amendments resulted in new protective constraints on 
settlement stock alienation, subject to removal by Native stockholders, and 
permanent protections for undeveloped land against taxation or other external 
attachment unless boards of directors of Native corporations put the land at risk. 
These "1991 amendments" made Alaska Natives the apparent masters of their own 
destiny, though in a corporate, not a tribal, context. 
The fundamental premises of ANCSA were not redefined by Congress as it 
amended the act. A corporate settlement with land treated as non-trust real estate 
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remained at the heart of the arrangement. Village tribes, assuming they existed, 
were not parties to the arrangement. 
Advocates of the corporate, "Alaska is dif erent" model were joined in debates 
over Congressional amendments by a second faction who looked at "lower 48" tribal 
rights as a source of ultimate federal protection. They were motivated by corporate 
bankruptcy, selective examples of land loss, and also by coalitions of villages who saw 
traditional controls of community life, especially subsistence, slipping away. The act 
may or may not have been terminationist in intent. However, reductions in levels of 
federal programmatic support for Alaska Natives and an increased presence of state­
guided governmental activities in rural Alaska suggested to some that village life 
controlled by Natives would be a victim of policy, if not direct Congressional edict. 
Canadian jurist Thomas Berger found serious flaws at the heart of the act 
(Berger, 1985, 1988). Others noted that even federal monies earmarked for Alaska 
Natives as Indians passed through nontribal, non-profit regional corporations. 
Village Natives beca me increasingly disempowered and tribes were threatened by 
their lack of involvement in governmental activities around them as much as by their 
still uncertain legal status (Conn and Garber, 1981). 
The heart of what Berger discovered in his many Alaska hearings was concern 
by residents that vast subsistence estates were no longer owned by villages. Berger 
understood, as many who had advocated the corporate model did not, that subsistence 
defined rural Native life. It gave purpose to Alaska villages and provided the inner 
logic of Native tribal identity. Now much of the land on which subsistence occurred 
was not Native land and governed by a blend of federal and state laws. 
Congress had not ignored traditional and customary subsistence rights 
extinguished by ANCSA. Lengthy hearings had established its fundamental 
rationale as a source of the Native way of life (Conn and Garber, 1989). Yet it also 
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had not abandoned the logic of ANCSA, especially the substantial role of state 
involvement in government of rural Alaska. 
In the Alaska National Interest Land and Conservation Act (ANILCA), a 
second piece of major legislation, Congress created a vast national park system (U.S. 
Congress, 1980). ANILCA of ered the state of Alaska the opportunity to direct the 
management of fish and wildlife on federal and state lands so long as it gave a 
priority to traditional and customary subsistence among "rural Alaskans, " subject 
only to conservation of the resources. Thus, Alaska Native villages not only lost their 
traditional land base for subsistence, but lost direct governmental control over it. 
Tribal advocates sought renewed Congressional affirmation of village 
sovereignty. Proposed strategies ranged from legal control of the village core 
(Berger, 1985) to legal control of areas where subsistence took place (Anderson and 
Aschenbrenner, 1988). The state, sensing that it had eliminated a fundamental 
attribute for fixing the dimensions of sovereignty - geographical jurisdiction - by 
advocating a transfer of settlement land to corporations, fought tribal advocates at 
every turn. Even in matters where political logic would suggest that a partnership 
between village tribes and the state would insure availability of services and a 
continuing flow of federal dollars for Alaska Natives as American Indians, the state 
persisted. State lawyers directly challenged the historical reality of tribes, even in 
the face of federal court rulings that Congress must expressly terminate aboriginal 
sovereign rights (Miller, 1989). 
What Alaskans Discovered 
In Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland (197 7 ), Thomas Berger had presented 
Canadians with a vision of Native self-determination which well stated aspirations of 
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D ene and Inuit peoples (among other s) on both sides of the bor der . Becau se he 
addr essed t he sit uat ion of abor iginal peoples in a terr itor y  who had some lever age 
over t he political process because of the anticipat ed natur al gas pipeline, unr esolved 
abor iginal claims and tr eaty r ights and the absence of dir ect pr ovincial involvement ,  
he could pr oj ect a visionar y sett lement which met t he full spectrum of abor iginal 
needs. That vision, a r ecapitulat ion of t he t est imony of t err it or ial resident s, 
for eshadowed t he t est imony of Nat ive Alaskans about ANCSA sever al year s lat er .  
What was desir ed, he suggest ed, was mor e t han a sett lement for a cor por ate land 
base and compensat ion (as in Alaska) and mor e  t han delegat ed gover nment al 
author it y. Berger explicit ly r ejected both t he ANCSA-style settlement and t hat of 
t he J ames Bay and Norther n Q uebec Agr eement (1 975). His infor mants desir ed 
gover nment al contr ol over their r esour ce base, guided by t heir own polit ical 
inst itut ions, center ed on a hunt ing, fishing and tr apping economy. He envisioned 
t hat such a sett lement would place in Native hands collect ive control of t he land and 
at least partial contr ol over exploit at ion of non-r enewable r esour ces (Ber ger , 
1 97 7 : 1 7 8). 
Not only will such owner ship give them the legal basis from which they 
can negot iat e wit h  gover nment and industr y t o  ensur e that any 
pr oposed development s  are envir onmentally acceptable, it will also 
enable t hem t o  shar e  in t he benefit s  of economic development . 
R oyalties from the development of non-r enewable r esour ces could be 
used to moder nize t he nat ive economy and to pr omote development of 
r enewable r esour ces. (Ber ger , 1 97 7: 179) 
AN CSA had r obbed Nat ives of political control. It was, he wrote, irr emediably 
assimilat ionist , transfor ming hunt ers and gather ers into capitalist s by destroying 
t heir land base ([d . : 17 7 ). The James Bay Agr eement failed t o  offer Cr ee or Inuit 
sufficient polit ical contr ol or vet o power over non-r enewable r esour ce development 
that t hr eatened subsist ence.4 
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Ber ger assumed that pol it ical contr ol of t he terr it ory could be r et ained as 
development and inmigr at ion occurr ed, t his t hr ough dur at ional r esidency 
r equir ements (Ber ger , 1977 :193 ). 
Ber ger 's cr it ique of indigenous needs bot h in Canada and in Alaska and his 
assessment of indigenous aspir ations wer e accur at e. In both places t he local 
populat ions placed a pr imary value on their r elat ionships wit h t he land and it s 
r esour ces. Bot h village const ituencies viewed wit h skepticism tr eat ies ( in the case of 
Canada) or sett lements  (in t he case of Alaska) which purported t o  diminish t heir 
control over t he land. Bot h t he Northwest Terr itory and r ur al Alaska fear ed not only 
an incr ease in lay ers of gover nment which they did not control but a sy stemat ic 
infl ux of non-Natives attr act ed by that same heightened gover nment al act ivity . 
Each side of t he bor der has abor iginal peoples whose isolated lives have been 
litt le affected by r eser ves and for malized Indian gover nment s. Each gr oup was 
thr eatened by populat ion expl osions, expl oitat ion of non-r enewable r esour ces and 
incr eased contr ol by non-indigenous gover nments. 
Given t his clear and wel l-publicized art iculation of aboriginal vision, coupled 
wit h det ailed cr it iques of moder n as well as hist or ical attempts to  deal wit h Nort her n  
peoples, one may ask what ar e the pr esent cir cumst ances of these same gr oups? To 
what ext ent do par allel opportunit ies and pr oblems per sist? 
By 1983 , abor iginal peoples of Canada had secur ed what appear ed on it s face t o  
be t he dream of all aboriginal peoples - entrenchment of exist ing abor iginal r ight s, 
treaty r ight s  and even pr ospect ively negot iat ed land claims agreement s int o  t he 
r epatr iat ed constitut ion (Pent ney , 1987 ).5 Thus, in Canada, Indian affair s departed 
from a patt er n est ablished in Nort h Amer ica of legal arr angements  capable of being 
unilat er ally alt er ed by t he feder al gover nment wit hout negotiat ed consent by 
affect ed tr ibes. Alaska Nat ive tribal r ights advocates looked wit h envy at such an 
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arrangement. Y et the dark shadow of prior government acts over newly achieved 
constitutional arrangements suggest that there is less apparent strength in the 
constitutional mandate than meets the eye. 
Overshadowing the new arrangement is the spectre that many rights have 
already been extinguished. The famous Calder case had predicted this. When a 
divided Canadian Supreme Court found in 1973 that Indian historic occupation and 
possession established Indian title as an independent legal right recognized, but not 
created by the Royal Proclamation of 17 63 ,  three members suggested that later 
governmental acts had extinguished such title. 
Within the realm of treaty rights, the federal government's long established 
duty to deal with Indians and lands reserved for Indians, confirmed in section 91(24) 
of the British North Am erica Act, had been seriously affected by natural resource 
transfer agreements signed with the western provinces. These acts had arguably 
given provinces a direct role in selection of lands for the benefit of Indian bands, 
powerful leverage on the process. 
Indian tribal sovereignty had been seriously eroded by replacement of tribal 
authority with delegated authority by the often- amended Indian Act and by already 
implemented constitutional authority to apply provincial laws of general application 
in education, criminal and civil law and many other areas to Indians on and of  
reserves (Hogg, 1985). 
That both federal and provincial ministers were aware of the strength of their 
bargaining positions was evident in the series of constitutionally mandated First 
Minister Conferences when First Ministers refused to graft more detailed proposals of 
aboriginal groups into the constitution, especially j udicially enforceable aboriginal 
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rights to self-government. The federal government retreated from its desired role as 
advocate for the Indian positions and sought to broker a compromise. 
Some Canadian authorities argue that a federal political and judicial pattern 
had already been established to encourage provincial assumption of responsibility for 
Native services. Little room had been left for Indian governmental activity based on 
"inherent jurisdiction" (See Long and Boldt, 1988:6-7) 
Federal government has not yet developed a coherent policy on 
provincial responsibility for services to Indians; however, it is now 
adhering to the basic principle that it should cease to create special 
services of its own for Indians and, wherever feasible, should integrate 
Indians into the provincial framework of services. (Id. , 9.) 
This arrangement very well typifies the direction of federal policy in Alaska in 
the post-AN CSA era. Direct Bureau of Indian Affairs involvement in Native 
schooling gave way to a regionally-based state system of schools. Area offices of the 
Bureau closed. State organized boroughs and nonprofit regional corporations 
absorbed the responsibilities for delivering what had been (and were still on lower 48 
reservations) Indian programs. 
ANILCA's condition for state management of fish and game that it impose a 
preference for traditional and customary subsistence for rural residents left Alaska 
in the ironic position of having to discover and enforce village-defined tribal law (See 
Conn and Garber, 1989). The state supreme court ruled even this strange 
compromise to be unconstitutional (see below). In Canada unfettered off-reserve 
rights to hunt and fish set forth in treaties while not unilaterally restricted by 
provincial laws of general application because they affected Indians as Indians, were 
still affected by those same laws as incorporated through of section 88 of the Indian 
Act (R . v. Dick, 1985). In both places, Natives confronted restrictions on their 
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activities rooted in conservation practices as well as individual game limits often 
inappropriate to the underlying sharing and distributive ethic of subsistence. 
While the federal government of Canada appears to agree that subsurface 
rights should be included in land settlements, the provincial position is colored by its 
desire to do little or nothing to curb resource exploitation in order to recoup revenues 
it spends on services to aboriginal peoples. The federal government has the principal 
obligation to fulfill indigenous expectations. But because the provinces possess the 
unoccupied Crown land, provincial ability to influence the negotiations is persistent. 
In Alaska, ANCSA has been structured to assure that natural resources would 
be taxed by the state when developed as in Canada. Lands selected were placed in 
grids which assured access to non-Native lands for development as in Canada. 
Native corporations have control over development of their own lands. But as 
pressures mounted for corporate profits, pressures also mounted to exploit resources 
known to exist. State and federal decisions decried by Berger became "Native 
decisions." Useful institutional buffers to retard development which existed at the 
inception of ANCSA with Congressional distribution of surface estates to villages 
and subsurface estates to regional corporations dropped away when many regions 
merged the village and regional corporations in order to protect the former from 
bankruptcy. The Alaska lesson appears to be that even with confirmed Native 
control over resource exploitation, exploitation which may impair subsistence 
activity, Native corporations are likely to be guided by the economic imperatives of 
hard times in the villages and diminished federal and state spending in rural Alaska6 
(See Conn, 1988). 
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The Territoria l a nd Developmenta l Impera tive 
A thesis of this pa per ha s been tha t India n policy in a ll countries is much 
a ffected by its politica l a nd historica l context. This wa s true in "lower 48 " 
developments a nd rema ins true in Ca na da a nd in Ala ska . 
Two fa ctors a ppea r  to be motiva tors. The first is the sta te/provincia l desire to 
control la nd a nd resources. In Ala ska , the cla ims settlement a ct wa s a necessa ry 
prerequisite to sta te la nd selection a nd the further division of sta te a nd federa l la nd 
ownershp a nd ma na geria l responsibilities. In Ca na da , the modern India n law era 
wa s hea vily infl uenced by more tha n recent court determinations tha t there were, in 
fa ct, a borigina l cla ims to settle. Despite a strong fe dera l commitment to open 
negotia tions on comprehensive cla ims by the Ta sk Force to Review Comprehensive 
Claims Po licy (See DIAND, 198 5), the a bsence of la rge a mounts of federa lly owned 
la nd slowed such negotia tions except where a second fa ctor ca me into play . Tha t 
factor wa s the prospect tha t a la rge developmenta l project would be delay ed by 
judicia l proceedings. It ha d resulted in Q uebec in the Ja mes Bay a nd Northern 
Q uebec Agreement of 19 7 5  a nd implementing legisla tion.7 
A strong developmenta l objective a nd a stock of la nd under federa l control 
seemed to be twin prerequisites for positive na tiona l movement in India n affa irs. In 
Ca na da they a re a va ila ble only in the territories. With the exception of Ja mes Bay in 
the provinces, a borigina l a dvoca tes fo und ca use for hope only in the territories 
beca use negotia tions were perceived to be la rgely bila tera l a nd not tripa rtite. It wa s 
hoped tha t federa l interest in development a nd fe dera l ownership of la nd plus the 
rela tively sma ll non-Na tive popula tions would result in cla ims a greements tha t 
connected politica l control a nd la nd control in way s  distinctly superior to tha t of the 
Ala ska settlement or the Ja mes Bay a greement. 
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Tribal Models Compared 
Alaska Natives, Canadian Inuit and Dene have developed several sophisticated 
models of indigenous government as alternatives to mere participation in a federal 
territorial government, transformed into a province by devolution. For Inuit, 
division of the geographic territory to retain their plurality is the preferred route 
with involvement in what is termed a consociational association of cultural 
communities, a second choice (Dacks, 1988:228-29). Alaska Natives who seek a 
reassertion of tribal rights have focused upon development of loose coalitions of 
villages, chief among these the Yupik Nation in Southwestern Alaska and the 
Tanana Chiefs of the Interior. Much political activity is village-centered. Yet until 
tensions and competition between non-profit Native regional corporations who 
receive funds and deliver services and villages who desire to control these decisions is 
resolved, Alaska, the state, will not confront serious tribal competitors to its 
centralized government. The differences in models between the NWT and Alaska 
exist in part because the core of Native legal sovereignty is village Alaska. Each 
village is a potential federal Indian tribe. However inefficient is the prospect of 200 
plus tribes, within Alaska many villages are endeavoring to prove their sovereignty 
both to outsiders through the courts and to residents by taking on increasing levels of 
governmental responsibilities. Many are actively seeking confirmation of their legal 
status as Indian tribes in federal courts as a prelude to further political definition of 
their powers as tribes (Miller, 1989). However, in Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management and Planning, the state supreme court has questioned whether Alaska 
Native villages are federally recognized tribes (Alaska State Supreme Court, 1988). 
This decision has serious short-term implications for business and political 
initiatives of Alaska Native villages since it strips tribal officials of immunities from 
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suit. However, village goverments continue to function. Further, the federal courts 
have in two important cases found proof of Congressional acknowledgment of Alaska 
village tribal status through its application of the Indian Reorganization Act, the 
claims process and other legislation (Miller, 1989:20-25). The pertinent point for a 
comparative analysis is that Alaska villages may one day be able to employ their 
original status as leverage in negotiations with state and federal governments. 
However, they may be forced to seek further political delegation (or devolution) of 
authority from the federal and state governments in a manner similar to Canadian 
Indian bands when questions of the scope of tribal authority are considered. This is 
true because the state, like many Canadian provinces, has a very significant role in 
daily village life. 
The Berger model, articulated in Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland, 
stresses that comprehensive land claims should include development of a third order 
of government - a Denendeh Nation or Nunavuk Nation - controlled by the 
aboriginal population. But can it be wrested from federal negotiators even in the 
Northwest Territory? 
That vision of the future apparently has passed in 1989. A review of the 
Dene/Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement in Principle ( 1988) suggests a 
more modest return to categories of land ownership and co-management of wildlife 
resources as first defined in the James Bay Agreement.8 
On the broad front of self-government, recent accords in British Columbia and 
Alberta are modeled on municipal governments, the same devolutionary model once 
criticized as an insufficient substitute for a tribal model based on principles of 
inherent sovereignty. 
What has occurred? At least one factor is that the special exclusive leverage 
that Northern peoples and the federal government once had over territorial land 
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rights and territorial dest iny may be diminis hed by the propos ed Meech Lake Accord 
of 1987 . If adopted as an amendment to the Cons titution it would require unanimous 
provincial consent for admis s ion of any new t er ritory as a new pro vince. This 
provides enormous provincial leverage on ongoing negoti ations over such mat ters as 
allocation of non-renewable res our ces between the new provinces and t he nation. 
(See Erasmus , 1987 . )  At leas t as important is an increas ing sens e of pess imism 
among lawyers that jurist s will dis co ver and expand upon exis ting aboriginal 
cons tit utional rights in the provinces or the t er ritory (Akhavan, ND ). 
At leas t one other circu ms tance dese rves mention becaus e it is perhaps more 
important to an Alaskan obs er ver than to a Canadian. The land cla ims period of 
Alaska gave ris e to indirect r epresenta tion of Nat ive villages by urban units s uch as 
the Alas ka Federati on of Natives and ot her for- or non-profit regional corporat ions . 
Federal and s tate repres entatives become accu stomed to  dea ling with near-at-hand 
and urban (or r egional) re pr es ent atives . Thes e organiz ations cont inued to se rve as 
lobbyists and, ultimat ely, as pass through agencies for deliver y of services . In Canada 
an Alaskan obs erver was s truck by this s ame phenomenon at the First Mini ster 
Confe rences . Once formed to r epres ent rural and far-flung Native communities , it is 
hard for s uch s econdary organizations to disb and. It is als o hard for villages to 
displace t hem in the halls of Congress or at t he negotiat ing tab les . Recent Canadian 
land ri ght s  agr eements  in principle mirror Alaska and J ames Bay models in t heir 
allo cat ion of future negot iat ing or managerial aut hor it y  to  land claims s et tlement 
corporations and wildlife manageme nt b oards. They ma y reflect another danger ou s  
trend in adminis tra tive detachment of po wer from Native communities . Certainly in 
Alas ka villages, efforts to retu rn the role of ne gotia tor and program manager to 
villages from r egional cor porat ions have been s low to occur as both Nat ive r egi ona l 
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representatives and state/federal agencies resist this change m the name of 
efficiency, cooperation or job entitlement. 
So where do the parallels in Alaska and Canada persist? In neither place is the 
vision of Justice Thomas Berger and his constituents achieved. In both places state 
and provincial hostility to a formula ofland claims that achieves sovereign control of 
land and resource management holds sway, aided by federal disinterest in both 
places in overly antagonizing provincial/state interests. In neither place is fear of a 
pending development project or federal ownership of public lands a sufficient prod for 
negotiations toward an amended or new settlement.9 In both places tribal legal 
advocates will, in the next few years, attempt test cases to determine the scope of 
existing aboriginal rights to self-government, perhaps arguing that historical 
substitutes were never intended to extinguish inherent (and persistent) forms of 
community control. Other elements of the indigenous communities will settle into 
the business of land management and consultation. At this moment in time the 
positions of Alaska Natives and Canadian Aboriginal Peoples are similarly uncertain 
and favorable. Advocates and leaders on both sides of the border have much to do to 
protect their land and way of life. Learning about developments across the border is 
part of this process. 
If Alaska Indian law advocates must learn of Canada and Canada learn of 
Alaska, how can they do so? The indigenous leaders and their professional advocates 
in each place must have an ever current source of information on foreign events 
which could have either a direct or persuasive impact on their problems. This 
information should include: 
1. Legislation and case law which affect hunting and fishing rights on non­
tribal land and the shared responsibility among state (provincial), federal and tribal 
(band) authorities for subsistence management. 
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2 .  Material on shared responsib ility among st ate (provincial), tribal (band) and 
feder al authorities for definition and deliver y of government al services to Indians 
and other indigenous peoples. Cost shari ng arrangements should be detailed along 
with political arrangements. 
3 .  Accounts of implementation of land claims arrangements with particular 
attent ion to implementati on of arrangement s  which provide shared participation i n  
resource explorat ion and resource governance. 
These three areas of endeavor r efl ect special realities in both places. Hunti ng 
and fishing continues to shape the identi ty and economic survival of i ndigenous 
peoples in t he North as in no ot her place in t he world. Provi ncial infl uence as we ll as 
federal influence i s  continuous and is not li kely to disappear. In both places the scope 
of tr ibal aut hority is not likely to be fu lly defined through court decisions, even 
decisions which rediscover or confirm unexti nguished tribal authority . Negotiat ion 
with state and provincial authori ti es mu st follow. The federal r ole may b e  limi ted to 
bearing costs of responsib ilities undert aken by the tribe (or band). Finally ,  
exploration of natur al resources with an ey e t owar d  protect ion of indigenous 
acti vi ti es and subsidizati on of much ot her tri bal activity involves complex 
indigenous-stat e  (provincial) and federal negot iati on. Eve n in the Canadian 
ter ritori es, i t  is likely t hat provi nci al influence on polit ical aspirations of t he 
territ ori es will require compromise and sharing with the provinces. 
If it is acknowl edged that there is a criti cal need for an information fl ow 
between Canadian and Alaskan Native ri ghts advocates and their consti tuent 
groups, how might that be achieved? Many approaches whet the appetite but do not 
serve this purpose. 
When t he Alask a Native Review Commission import ed former British 
Columb ia J usti ce Thomas Berger t o  study the impact of t he Alaska Claims 
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Settlement Act, he used a process of hearings developed during his study of the 
MacKenzie Valley Pipeline in Anchorage and in Native villages. His Anchorage 
forums explicitly placed the Alaska situation within the context of transnational and 
international law and his invited guests included Native leadership and experts on 
Canada and elsewhere. 
There is currently planned a state bar convention in Anchorage which will 
feature at least one panel of Soviet, Canadian and Alaska attorneys who will deal 
with Native issues in a comparative context. 
Some University of Alaska faculty have used Canadian government faculty 
research grants to retrieve important information on Canadian aboriginal policy for 
use in research papers in classes. Some of these same faculty members (Conn, a 
lawyer and Langdon, an anthropologist) have held interdepartmental seminars on 
Alaska issues at the Department of Justice and Department oflndian and Northern 
Affairs. · Such ventures do much to create baseline research collections and networks 
for further professional exchanges. Finally, the University library has acquired texts 
on Indian law and the best single compiled source of information on Canadian judicial 
activity in the field, the Canadian Native Law Reporter, published quarterly by the 
University of Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre. 
From the Alaska side there are yearly compendia of Alaska Native Issues 
issued out by the Alaska Native Law section of the Alaska State Bar Association, but 
these are issued only to section members. The benchmark classic, Alaska Natives and the Law, by former professor David Case remains a useful frame of reference for 
understanding Alaska Native issues in their context. However, given the 
momentum of legal activity the book needs some updating to address current issues. 
While there is no equivalent in Alaska to the Canadian Native Law Reporter, there is 
at the national level the Indian Law Reporter, a regular publication which the 
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American Indian Lawyers training program produces for law librari es with monthly 
summaries of federal, state and tribal court cases. 
What is needed i s  an ent irely new component of a regularly received legal poli cy 
j our nal that addresses developments i n  each ef ective ar ena where poli cy i s  debated 
and generated: 
1. in federal and state courts; 
2. in federal and state legislative process; 
3 .  through execut ive branch activity; and 
4. through poli tical meetings and negotiations of constituent tribal groups. 
For Ameri can Indian law practitioners, the Alaska situati on has alr eady 
proven to be a singular departure from the way they were trained in law school or 
even their professional experience wi th "lower 48" t ribes. Rather than focusing 
exclusi vely upon litigation i n  federal court, advocates find that t hey must engage in 
several arenas at once. They must secure gains in federal court through negot iation 
wi th state officials before those gains are obliterated by reversal s in the nation' s 
highest court. At the same time, Alaska Native groups with entirely dif erent 
perspectives on their legal and political situation must draw together into posit ions 
with sufficient commonalit y to present a united front in negotiations at the state and 
feder al legislative and executive levels. 
Indian law in Al aska, in a word, has become more Canadian in it s operative 
polit ical premises in Alaska and less reminiscent of practice in the "lower 48. " How 
is Indian law more strategically Canadian? First, as in Canada, Alaska Natives are 
confronted with a strong state presence in t he defini tion oflndian policy. This st ate 
presence manifest s itself in a per sistent and hosti le state court acti vi sm and a 
persistent wi lli ngness to lit igate in state and federal courts against all legal premises 
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which favor tribes. It effectively makes political negotiations with the state difficult 
or impossible, even in realms where Indian law issues are not at the center of the 
discussion. 
Subsistence 
The carefully crafted compromise between state leaders, Natives and the 
Congress which provided for long-desired state management of fish and game on all 
public lands in exchange for a commitment to provide a subsistence preference for 
urural residents," was undone by a 1989 state supreme court decision (McDowell et al. v. A laska et al.) which found it violative of the state constitution. To override this 
decision, the state must either amend its constitution by popular referendum or the 
Congress must order the state to apply the preference as an attribute of federal 
Indian law. Neither option would be easy to accomplish. The result of this broken 
compromise could mean a return to federal managment. Or, conversely, it could 
mean an attempt by anti-Native forces to have Congress eliminate the preference or 
attach it to a needs-based test. In any event, it has thrown the matter of subsistence 
rights into turmoil. There are no American models for brokering another 
compromise although there may well be Canadian models which could be followed 
where off-reserve treaty rights are subject to provincial fish and game laws. 
Government Services 
What had been a continuous trend of seeking to improve the basic governmental 
services in Alaska's rural villages through a partial allocation of authority among 
state, village and regional Native groups is now clouded with doubt as state attorneys 
monitor such arrangements because allocation to villages could be viewed in court 
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cases as eviden ce of t rial act ivity. Negotiation s on such non -t ribal mat ters as service 
t o  children in n eed of fost er placemen t or family support have broken down over their 
"In dian law implicat ion s. "  
In Can ada where the provin cial presen ce on In dian reserves is well established, 
models of delegated mun icipal authority or power sharin g between provin ces an d 
In dian ban ds, based on relative capacity to serve con st ituent groups, have emerged in 
B ritish Columbia an d in other west ern provin ces. These arran gements are n early 
always reached with a mut ual un derstan din g t hat they will n ot abridge an y 
discovered an d un ext in guished aborigin al right s est ablished in lat er court decision s. 
Their advan tage is that t hey allow basic n eeds for govern men tal services to be met 
without the n ear paralysis of activity n ow foun d in Alaska. 
Can ada also has n eeds for Alaska models. When the Nort hern Q uebec Cree 
desired to improve court services in lan ds af orded them in the J ames B ay 
Sett lemen t, they looked to Alaska where, as there, state courts an d n ot tribal courts 
han dled the lion' s share of local activity. They sought rearrangemen t of provin cial 
allocat ion s  of jurisdict ion al authority an d an in creased role for Cree participan ts. 
Y et tribal court models foun ded on American In dian reservation s were 
in appropriate. 
So how can commun ication be established which provides a st eady fl ow of 
information in the man y forums in which In dian law act ivity is played out, the multi­
leveled forums of Can ada an d Alaska? 
The author suggests, for a start , that a special section on comparative Alaska­
Can ada In dian law act ivit y be presen ted in both t he Indian Law Reporter an d 
Canadian Native Law Reporter, a section which con tain s an alysis of court decision s, 
provin cial an d federal in itiat ives an d on goin g n egotiat ion s of in terest to bot h  
in digen ous groups. These legal an alyses would lin k events in both coun tries an d 
- 25 -
would offer readers the names, addresses and telephone numbers of key participants 
for further discussion and elaboration. The advantage of this approach over academic 
forums or sporadic briefing sections would be their efficient distribution by the 
periodicals already found in most major university and law libraries. Current 
information would allow for immediate application to current problems in each place 
and efficient networking. 
Who could author this special comparative law section? Scholars and Indian 
law practitioners grounded in the Indian law systems in both countries (as most 
Indian law practitioners are not) would undertake the responsibility for this work. 
Along with this current update on the multi-leveled Indian law activity, the 
authors would suggest a basic library of books on the context in which Indian law 
occurs in each country. This basic bookshelf on the historical and political evolution 
of the tripartite Indian law relations in each place could be introduced through 
professional seminars at the Federal Indian Bar Association in the United States and 
in similar forums in Canada. 
Shared Concerns 
Advocates in both countries are concerned by an increasing number of 
international accords which affect hunters and wildlife in both countries. Indigenous 
rights advocates must negotiate in new international forums and with host countries 
to assure that ratification of these accords does not destroy already negotiated 
arrangements with federal and state authorities. 
From this constant exchange of information should emerge a network of 
practitioners who can share information on the process and technique of negotiation 
in each place. 
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The irony of t his proposal is t hat it follows by many ye ars init iat ive s  
unde rt ake n by Nort he rn pe ople to  e xplore mode ls for sub siste nce manage me nt , 
e ducat ion and gove rnance in othe r nort he rn count rie s. Trib al rights advocate s have 
bee n  more parochial t han the ir clie nts in re cognizing t hat t he re is a body of le gal and 
polit ical informat ion ne arb y which can e nhance the ir act ivit ie s at home . This 
parochialism by professionals must e nd if Indian policy in Alaska and Canada is t o  
advance on dif e re nt but paralle l t racks. 
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Footnotes 
1. During the termination era Congress unilaterally terminated fed eral relations 
with many tribes, leaving them at the mercy of state governments. Its counterpart, 
the 1969 white paper in Canad a, is said to have sparked the entire belated 
reevaluation of Canad ian Indian policy. 
2. This is not to say that Canad ian Ind ian policy was uniform. As Sand ers notes, 
"Half of the country was covered by treaties and half was not. The fed eral 
government for many years asserted a national policy by d ismissing the significance 
of the treaties and rejecting claims to aboriginal rights on the others. " (Sand ers, 
1988: 173 in Long and Bold t eds., 1988). 
3 .  Guerin v. R (1985) 13 DLR (4th) 3 90, 400. Sand ers (1987 ) writes on Guerin (at 
186): 
The fiduciary obligation of the Government of Canad a arose because of 
the pre-existing Ind ian rights. Indi an rights and the Crown' s fid uciary 
obligation were confirmed , not created , by the provisions of the Royal 
Proclamation of 17 63 and the Ind ian Act. 
Remarkable as it may seem, the Guerin d ecision is the first clear 
Canad ian d ecision that Ind ian rights arise out of the pre- existing 
ind igenous legal ord er, and not from some common law d octrine of 
aboriginal title or by virtue of an affirming action by the colonial legal 
system. 
4. Berger's analysis is important: 
The J ames Bay Agreement, for example, requires, even in the case of 
Category 1 land s [ land around villages] , the Native people to permit 
subsurfa ce owners to use the surfa ce in the exercise of their rights. 
Ind eed , they must permit surface use even to owners of subsurfa ce 
rights ad jacent to Category 1 land s. 
The subservience of the surfa ce owner is often economic as well as legal, 
particularly in the North, because the short-term value in d ollars of oil, 
gas or minerals lying beneath a tract of land usually exceed s its short­
term value fo r  hunting, fishing and trapping. (Berger, 197 7 : 17 9) 
The James Bay Agreement includ es guarantees to protect hunting, 
fishing and trapping rights. Are they not ad equate? In the Agreement, 
the native people have exclusive hunting, fishing and trapping rights in 
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Category 2 lands, and the Cree may select 25, 000 square miles of such 
lands, but they have no speci al ri ght of occupancy: the Government of 
Q uebec may desi gnate these lands for development purposes at any 
ti me, so long as the land used for development i s  replaced or 
compensati on pai d. Mi ni ng, sei smi c explorati on and techni cal surveys 
are not, however, classi fied as development, so these acti viti es may be 
carried out freely on Category 2 lands, wi thout compensati on or 
replacement of land, even though such acti vi ty may i nterfere wi th the 
nati ve people's hunti ng, fishi ng and trappi ng. Category 3 lands are 
i ncluded i n  the publi c lands of the Provi nce of Q uebec: the nati ve people 
have the ri ght to hunt, fi sh and trap on them, and certai n speci es of 
ani mals and bi rds may be reserved for thei r exclusi ve use. However, 
development of these lands may take place at any ti me wi thout 
compensati on i n  any form to nati ve people. 
The land regi me of the Agreement i s  buttressed by provi si ons for 
sustai ned levels of harvesti ng, a guaranteed mi ni mum annual i ncome 
for hunters and trappers, and an elaborate scheme for the parti ci pati on 
of nati ve people i n  game management and envi ronmental protecti on. 
However, i n  nearly every case, their parti ci pati on i n  thi s scheme i s  
advi sory and consultati ve. (Berger, 197 7 : 17 8) 
5. Secti on 3 5(1) of the Consti tuti on Act, 1982, provi des that "the existi ng 
abori gi nal and treaty rights are hereby recogni zed and affirmed. Aborigi nal peoples 
are speci fical ly i dentified as 'Indi an, Inui t and Meti s peoples of Canada. " '  
To thi s was added "(3 ) For greater certai nty, i n  subsection (1) ' treaty ri ghts' 
i ncludes ri ghts that now exi st by way of land ri ghts agreements or may be so 
acqui red. " 
Secti on 25 of the Consti tuti on Act provi des that the "guarantee i n  this Charter 
of certain ri ghts and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate 
from any abori gi nal, treaty or other ri ghts or freedoms that pertai n to the abori gi nal 
peoples of Canada i ncludi ng: 
a. any ri ghts or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation 
of October 7 ,  17 63; and 
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b. any rights or freedoms that (may have been acqu ired by the original peoples 
by way of land claims settlements) ' that now exist by way of land claims agreements 
or may be so acqu ired. "' 
6. There are exceptions to this pictu re in Alaska. In cases where ru ral villages 
chose to take their execu tive order reserves in fee simple rather than participate 
further in the settlement act, villages have voted to retribalize the land by passing it 
into the hands of their tribal government. However, their further attempts to place it 
into a tru st relationship with the Secretary of the Interior have been rejected. 
7 .  Even in this single example of provincial su ccess one can argu e that lingering 
responsibilities of the province of Qu ebec to expedite settlement of aboriginal cl aims 
left u nsettled after bou ndary extensions of the province prompted the settlement 
reached. See Jef Richstone, "Aboriginal Rights in Qu ebec," 17 0-17 5 in R. Ku ppe Ed. , 
2 Law and Anthropology (1987 ) International Academy of Comparative Law, 12th 
Congress, Session A. 1 "The Aborigine in Comparative Law," Wien, Au stria: 
WWGO-Verlag. 
8. While the Final Agreement does not af ect the ability of participants to benefi t 
in existing or futu re constitu tional rights which may be applicable to them (3 . 1.3 ), it 
requ ires that they cede, release and su rrender all their aboriginal claims to lands and 
waters as well as to Treaty 8 and Treaty 11 with respect to any matter provided in the 
agreement, as well as claims arising from any Imperial or Canadian legislation or 
Order-in-Cou ncil (3 . 1. 9). Eligibility is based on descendency from designated Indian 
peoples who resided in the Mackenzie Basin on or before J anu ary 1, 1921 (4. 1. 1) as 
determined by a Central Enrollment Board (4.7 . 1). Canada will make a capital 
transfer payment to a designated Dene/Metis organization (8. 1. 1). Dene/Metis 
mu nicipal lands within local government bou ndaries are assessable (2. 1. 1). 
Undeveloped land granted will not be taxed (11.4. 1). Resou rce royalty sharing on a 
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per capi ta basi s wi ll be negoti ated but shall be li mi ted to annual payments of 50 per 
cent of the first two mi lli on dollars recei ved by the government and 10 per cent of any 
addi ti onal resource royalti es (10. 1.2). 
Dene/Meti s have the ri ght to harvest all speci es and populati ons of wi ldli fe 
wi thi n. the settlement area subject to li mi tati ons speci fied wi thi n the agreement 
(13.4. 1). Local counci ls wi ll govern harvesti ng by any person wi thi n the li mi ts 
prescri bed by laws af ecti ng wi ldli fe. Pri vately held lands and lands subject to 
mi li tary or nati onal securi ty i s  exempted. Clai ms partici pants wi ll be consulted 
when uses confli cti ng wi th harvesti ng objecti ves emerge wi th a ri ght to arbi trati on 
(13.4. 14). Whi le parti ci pants are expressly granted a ri ght to gi ve, trade, barter or 
sell all edi ble wi ldli fe products harvested to other Dene/Meti s and abori gi nal persons, 
i t  may not be exerci sed for profit (13 .4. 17 ). Further, the government reserves the 
ri ght to propose other legi slati on respecti ng human harvesti ng of wi ldli fe wi th a 
ri ght of consultati on by the Dene/Meti s (13 .4. 15). Harvest levels may be modi fied for 
conservati on purposes by the Wi ldli fe Management Board on whi ch Dene/Meti s 
parti ci pate (13. 5.2). 
New local governments on Dene/Meti s lands shall be establi shed after 
negoti ati on and agreement between the Terri tori al Government and "a desi gnated 
Dene/Meti s organi zati on" (25. 8. 1). 
9. It may be that the state' s fear that i t  wi ll lose manageri al authori ty over fish and 
game on federal lands wi ll prod i t  to gi ve ground at least on i ts hosti le posi ti on 
agai nst vi llage government. Nati ve ri ghts advocates wi ll play thi s card. 
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